# F/W

## \*\*Big Framework\*\*

#### OUR INTERPRETATION: The resolution asks a yes/no question as to the desirability of the United States Federal Government action. The role of the ballot should be to affirm or reject the actions and outcomes of the plan.

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K

 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is the three branches of government

Dictionary.com 2k6 [[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states+government](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united%2Bstates%2Bgovernment)]

|  |
| --- |
| noun |
| the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States  |

#### Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, Bryn Mawr College political science professor, ‘92

[Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70, accessed 10-7-12, AFB]

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Limits outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.

Goodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

#### Switch side debate is good-direct engagement, not abstract relation, with identities we do not identify with is critical to us to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards those with whom we disagree. Lack of switch-side facilitates a refusal to accept that our position is within question

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonisticrespect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the factthat their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree towhich each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes itsown position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal forthe creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies anenhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to thesenew and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference.Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore aliento [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement isthe means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

# K

## 1NC

#### Bataille’s economic principles provide no approach to political economy, they destroy any attempt to manage the distribution of wealth, and transgression and useless expenditure lead to the complete destruction of all human life—the aff is a completely failed approach to the possibility of a systemic critique of capitalism

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

In a practical perspective one can consider the natural foundation of society as con- sisting of energy in different forms, some of which make energy accessible to human exploitation. In spite of the theory of relativity and our knowledge of the world as one big ecosystem, in a practical perspective it therefore makes good sense to distinguish between dead and living matter and between matter and energy.120 These distinctions make plain the conflict between on the one side the circulation of money and commod- ities understood mechanically as dead matter and on the other side living organisms that are transformed quantitatively and qualitatively because of the accumulated energy inside living matter. The traditional models of economical thought are clearly hostile to the self-organizing life of nature,121 and this is with good reason. Economy in the ordi- nary sense aims at the optimal management of resources, and management is possible only if one assumes an appropriate degree of standstill and unchangeability; if every- thing moves and emerges by itself, then conscious management is impossible.¶ Bataille’s theoretical fight to think the unreduced desire and the flow of energy in nature into economy leaves an impression of economy as totally unmanageable and uncontrollable in a practical sense. The anti-authoritarian, theoretical perspective means that the general economy loses its character of political economy and instead transforms itself into a scientistic ontology, the alleged necessity of which contributes to legitimate ideologically a total liberation of desire and consumption, which in turn can legitimate a capitalist development without any restrictions. As mentioned, this was clearly not Bataille’s intention, but the conceptual logic in this part of his thinking does not leave him much choice. However, in this account of the objective basis for the general econ- omy, as it is presented in the first part of The Accused Share, one does not see many signs of the dialectical thinking, which is the foundation of the other two parts,122 and this ten- sion makes the project as a whole vulnerable to critiques of inconsistency. Actually Bataille himself became aware of the problems with reconciling the wish for political result, which was connected with the account of the objectively given, and the more in-depth reflections concerning the inner subjectively given experiences,123 and he actu- ally ended up declaring the very attempt to create the connection between the subjective¶ experiences of eroticism and sovereignty and what is objectively given by the use of resources as deeply problematic.124¶ It is thus as political economy that the general economy turns out to have its greatest limitations. The basic problem is that with Bataille’s extended sense of economy it becomes very difficult to recommend a definite economical strategy at the ordinary polit- ical level. His main concern is the material conflict between the human being and life as such, between the human expression of desire, which liberates energy for loss, and the accumulation of energy on the earth and in nature in general. The human being has in the historical development of civilization developed a still greater consumption of energy, and it is thus not just capitalism, which is self-destructive, but the very human way of being. What Bataille has pointed out at the individual and the historical level is actually an onto- logical problem. The full actualization of the potential of human desire in sovereignty can lead only to emptying out all disposable energy resources on earth, and that will mean the end, if not of life as such, then at least of the human way of living. The complete realization of the human potential of civilization liberates the energy piled up in and on the earth to take up again the interrupted flow, which destines energy to a final loss in the tepidness of the universe.

#### They are wrong about utility and rationality—their desire to sacrifice utility is the logic that enables capitalism to overcome its contradictions and expand so quickly it overcomes all other alternatives—they disable a critique of capitalism or any meaningful form of social transition

Sorenson, 2012

[Asger, philosophy of education at Aarhus University, On a universal scale: Economy in Bataille’s general economy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38(2) 169–197] /Wyo-MB

Bataille considers his general economy a political economy, and even though it can be thought of as apolitical, one can of course detect a more or less implicit preference for a kind of economical principle, as I have also argued. The problem is that the kind of eco- nomical thinking that actually can get some legitimacy from Bataille’s general economy, precisely is a kind of economical thinking that normally is considered very questionable from a left-wing perspective. According to Jean-Joseph Goux the general economy can be considered a precursor of the postmodern way to legitimize capitalism, which is found with the modern neo-conservative ideologist George Gilder. With reference to Mauss Gilder thinks of modern capitalism as an economy of excess, which provides objects for desire, before they are in demand. Desire as such is undetermined and can be formed according to the possibilities for satisfaction, which are offered. That means that it is sup- ply that determines demand, not the other way round.105 According to Gilder capitalism is irrational as a system, and it is precisely its nucleus of play and gambling, which has secured its ideological success confronted with the rationality of socialism. In postmo- dern capitalism you do not know which object your desire will be directed towards, and all kinds of satisfaction of desire can be developed into a profit-making industrial pro- duction of objects. In such an economic system, however, one cannot distinguish at a fundamental level between necessity and luxury, that is, between needs and desire, such as it has traditionally been the case in political economy. In consumer capitalism objec- tive utility is finally reduced to a contingent choice,106 a preference, which at the same time expresses subjective needs and desire.¶ Using this way of thinking in the development of a postmodern ideology for post- bourgeois hedonist consumer capitalism thus places Bataille, who think of himself as a radical leftist, in ‘bad company’.107 The general economy does not seem, as Bataille had hoped, to offer a clear alternative to an in-principle always restricted capitalist economy; quite on the contrary, it actually seems that the principles of general economy precisely are what capitalism needed to expand beyond its own ideological contradic- tions and limitations, in particular the conflict between neoclassical economy as a mechanical system, including the ideal of Homo economicus and then the idea of value as defined by subjective preferences, demand and desire. Economy in Bataille’s general sense thus seems to be realized as part of the neo-liberal world order, which is actually not an order at all, and the general economy can therefore be considered the ideological foundation for postmodern desire-capitalism run amok.

#### Fellow-feeling or compassion are impossible under a capitalist logic that monetizes all life, enabling the worst atrocities imaginable

Joel **Kovel**, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 20**02**, p. 141.

Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied by a racist drumbeat; for global capital, the losses are regrettable necessities.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OR KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

# Case

### 1NC - Case Frontline

#### Utilitarianism is good and is key to ethical decision making, because it ensures beings are treated as equal—any other approach to ethics is arbitrary because it considers one’s preferences as more important than others

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, <http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-2.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo. For some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the evidential status of judgements about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles (plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason. The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good. The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together, Sidgwick takes these axioms to imply a form of consequentialism. We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal. iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings. To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess. When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.

#### Instrumentalization is not bad or violent

Bush, 2012

[Stephen, assistant professor of religious studies at Brown University, GEORGES BATAILLE’S MYSTICAL CRUELTY, 0.3:551–555, 2012 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.] /Wyo-MB

However, I do not think that the instrumentalization/non- instrumentalization distinction has the ethical significance that Brint- nall attributes to it, and I do not think, as Brintnall and Bataille do, that subject-object relations involve “inherently alienating violence.” Not all instrumentalization is ethically problematic or tends toward violence. We instrumentalize each other all the time and could not carry on our affairs without doing so. Many goods we rightly regard as valuable require instrumentalizing relations. What matters is that when we treat others as a means to an end, we simultaneously respect them as an end in themselves. We cannot treat them as a mere means. It is possible to¶ regard someone as both a means and an end, in other words. This is what the Kantians tell us, and though I do not count myself among their number, they are on to something here. When we buy a head of lettuce at a farmer’s market, we treat the farmer as a means to our end, but the important thing is we do not treat her as merely a means. We must treat her in such a way that regards her as a means to our end (of obtaining salad ingredients) but also as someone who has her own ambitions, desires, concerns, attachments, and decision-making capacities. To give an extreme example: if we abducted her and kept her in captivity, forcing her to grow and provide food for us, then we would be treating her merely as a means. So the ethically relevant distinction is not between instrumentalizing and non-instrumentalizing relations with others, but rather between different types of instrumentalizing, subject-object relations.

#### Aff fails—rational utility inevitable—their author

Biles, 2011

[Jeremy, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/Community, Culture, Theory and Critique Volume 52, Issue 2-3, 2011 Special Issue: The God Who Would Not Die: Theological Remnants and Traces of a Hidden God in Twentieth Century French Thought, Taylor and Francis online] /Wyo-MB

And yet, the sacred, by its very nature, is fleeting; the passional effluxes of sacrifice inevitably wane, and the aims of instrumental reason invariably reassert themselves, giving rise again to the fear of the loss of self, and with it, the tendency to hypostasise work in the form of God. The remains of God, like the profane self that always returns, are never finally eradicated; prohibitions are re-installed, and the world of rational utility endures. Individuals are again themselves, discontinuous and isolated by the profane concerns of the workaday world and traditional social structures, deprived of the deep sense of continuity, or intimacy, that is afforded in transitory experiences of sacred community.

#### The sacrifice of the 1ac leads to the destruction of alterity

Biles, 2011

[Jeremy, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/Community, Culture, Theory and Critique Volume 52, Issue 2-3, 2011 Special Issue: The God Who Would Not Die: Theological Remnants and Traces of a Hidden God in Twentieth Century French Thought, Taylor and Francis online] /Wyo-MB

Jean-Luc Nancy's inquiry into the possibilities of an ‘inoperative community’ proceeds through a constellation of Bataillean concepts – sacrifice, death, sovereignty, ecstasy, and un-working. And yet, Nancy distances himself from Bataille, whom he believes succumbs to an ethically insupportable fascination with sacrifice. Bataille is beholden to the work of negativity, placing death at the heart of any possible community. Nancy seeks to correct this tendency by elaborating a vision of community based on ‘unworking’, a notion deriving from Bataille and Blanchot that is strongly reminiscent of the sacrificial logic it is meant to displace. In fact, as we will see below, Nancy's later writings on community appear to reinscribe sacrifice at the centre of community. Community, Nancy writes, ‘necessarily takes place in what Blanchot has called “unworking”, referring to that which, before or beyond the work, withdraws from the work, and which, no longer having to do either with production or with completion, encounters interruption, fragmentation, suspension. Community’, he continues, ‘is made of the interruptions of singularities … [it is] the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical, and institutional’ (Nancy 1991a: 31).¶ In this sense, ‘one does not produce [community], one experiences or one is constituted by it as the experience of finitude’ (Nancy 1991a: 31). Nancy affirms that the shared experience of finitude is a passion ‘of and for community itself, and this passion emerges as the desubjectivization of the passion for death’ (Nancy 1991a: 34). But Nancy's critique of Bataille also emerges with this point. By his reading, one danger of Bataille's emphasis on sacrifice is in the manner in which the passion for death is betrayed. The emphasis on ‘fusion’ – the loss of self in the experience of immanent continuity – is read by Nancy as too close to an appropriative totality, an erasure of alterity in an undifferentiated unity. Nancy's inoperative community would be established in the eruptive contact with singularities preserved, not lost in fusion.¶ In an essay entitled ‘The Unsacrificeable’ (1991b), Nancy adapts Heideggerian language in extending his critique of sacrifice and of Bataille. He argues that although existence is offered or ‘given’, it is neither given by nor to anyone. ‘The existent arrives’, he says, ‘takes place, and this is nothing but a being-thrown into the world. In this being-thrown, it is offered. But it is offered by no one, to no one. Nor is it self-sacrificed, if nothing—no being, no subject —precedes its being-thrown’. In light of this point, Nancy claims, Bataille ‘must be relentlessly corrected … withdrawn from the slightest tendency towards sacrifice’, for such a tendency ‘is always linked to a fascination with an ecstasy turned towards an Other or towards an absolute Outside, into which the subject is diverted/spilled the better to be restored’ (Nancy 1991b: 36).

#### Causes no value to life that turns the K

Baudrillard, 1990 (Jean, “The Transparency of Evil: Essay on Extreme Phenomena.”121-122, MB).

Inasmuch as the individual no longer confronts the other, he finds himself face to face with himself. On account of an aggressive backlash on the part of his immune system, a dislocation of his own code and the destruction of his own defences, the individual becomes in a sense an antibody to himself. Our society is entirely dedicated to neutralizing otherness, to destroying the other as a natural point of reference in a vast flood of aseptic communication and interaction, of illusory exchange and contact. By dint of communication, our society develops an allergy to itself. By becoming transparent in its genetic, biological and cybernetic being, the body even develops an allergy to its own shadow. Otherness denied becomes a spectre and returns in the form of a self destructive process. This, too, is the transparency of Evil. Alienation is no more: the Other as gaze, the Other as mirror, the Other as opacity - all are gone. Henceforward it is the transparency of others that represents absolute danger. Without the Other as mirror, as reflecting surface, consciousness of self is threatened with irradiation in the void. The utopia of the end of alienation has likewise disappeared. The subject has not succeeded in negating himself as subject, within the framework of a totalization of the world. A determinate negation of the subject no longer exists: all that remains is a lack of determinacy as to the position of the subject and the position of the other. Abandoned to this indeterminacy, the subject is neither the one nor the other - he is merely the Same. Division has been replaced by mere propagation. And whereas the other may always conceal a second other, the Same never conceals anything but itself. This is our clone ideal today: a subject purged of the other, deprived of its divided character and doomed to self-metastasis, to pure repetition. No longer the hell of other people, but the hell of the Same.

#### Batailles theory of expenditure leads to warfare and violence

Wilson, no date

[Julie, Unproductive expenditure and the spatial ground of the Earth: Bataille on the other side of Deleuze & Guattari, http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpbataille6.htm] /Wyo-MB

Both Bataille and Deleuze & Guattari’s ontological projects are fueled by attempts to understand the most radical of human movements through a conceptualization of war and its different forms. These different forms of war are absolutely fundamental for grasping the political claims of each project, not to mention the stakes that surround the category of unproductive expenditure. In the thought of Bataille two different forms of war emerge: war as mystical or inner experience, and war in the more conventional sense as death and destruction on the battlefield. Much of Bataille’s wartime writings can be read as attempts to see an equivalence between actual war and mystical experience. In his book Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred, Alexander Irwin references Bataille’s own words in “The Practice of Joy before Death:” “’I want to show that an equivalence exists between war, ritual sacrifice, and the mystical life.’ All these forms of behavior reflect ‘the same play of ‘ecstasies’ and ‘terrors’ in which man joins in the games of heaven’”(136). Bataille thus sees a fundamental similarity between the violence of the battlefield and mysticism in the ecstasy and terror that characterize both experiences; his insistence on the equivalence stems from both his energetic framework-- better known as general economy-- and the latter’s commitment to thinking through the category of unproductive expenditure, or the moment when production (and/or growth) has reached its terrestrial limits and must turn unproductive, or rather, destructive of energetic resources.¶ For Bataille, the emergence of war in both instances is intimately bound up in the category of unproductive expenditure; in fact, war is the moment and movement of unproductive expenditure, or profitless expenditure. In the energeticist ontology of Bataille, unproductive expenditure—consumptions and dissipations—are linked to the realm of the necessary; thus, so is war. In “The Practice of Joy before Death,” Bataille writes: “’I MYSELF AM WAR.’ I imagine human movement and excitation, whose possibilities are limitless: this movement and excitation can only be appeased by war” (Visions of Excess, 239). War, for Bataille, is the necessary and universal response to expansive and growth-seeking being; in this sense, war as profitless expenditure is fundamental to maintaining the balance of forces on Earth. War (and thus unproductive expenditure) engender destructions of forces and energies, but what Bataille desperately wants us to understand is that although war in-itself is immanent to and necessary for life, the form it will take is not an a priori. In Volume One of The Accursed Share, Bataille clarifies the central claims of his ontological project:¶ The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of the system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically (21).

#### Bataille’s philosophy causes a hostility to liberal democracy and humanism that results in fascism

Geroulanos, 2006

[OCTOBER 117, Summer 2006, pp. 3–24. © 2006 October Magazine, Ltd. and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The anthropology of exit: Bataille on Heidegger and Fascism] /Wyo-MB

¶ The association of Bataille with fascism has been a matter of considerable¶ ¶ debate, most of it pointing to his peculiar role in antifascist milieux. This is not the¶ ¶ place to retrace or replay that debate; still, the problem is signiﬁcant, because¶ ¶ Bataille’s political equivocation sets up his analysis and colors his identiﬁcation of¶ ¶ Heidegger with fascism. To quote Zeev Sternhell, “fascism had a fascination for men . . .¶ ¶ for whom any attempt to transcend bourgeois mediocrity and democratic ﬂaccidity¶ ¶ was highly praiseworthy.”3 That Bataille shared this fascination has given much ammunition to Bataille’s detractors, who argue that his nonconformism played an active¶ ¶ role in the delegitimation of the Third Republic.4¶ ¶ Some contemporary cultural historians have echoed Jean-Paul Sartre and other critics in arguing that Bataille’s¶ ¶ philosophical anthropology relied on a strategy of (a) articulating human experience¶ ¶ on the basis of vitalist or mystical postulates, and (b) providing a consequent critique¶ ¶ of bourgeois secularism (a critique ex deﬁnitione hostile to liberal democracy and¶ ¶ socialist utopia) that rivaled fascism in its reactionary aims and substance. Some further argue that Bataille’s claims on heterogeneity evince a hidden pro-Nazism that is¶ ¶ supposedly part and parcel of postwar critiques of liberal humanism.5¶

#### Fascism results in multiple scenarios for violence that outweigh the aff

Mills, 2004

[David, Attorney, 11-10-04, It's the Corporate State, Stupid, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7260.htm] /Wyo-MB

¶ Other notable characteristics of fascism described by Britt which are directly produced by corporatism are: ¶ < The suppression of organized labor (organized labor is the bane of corporations and the only real check on corporate power other than government or the legal system);¶ < Supremacy of the military (it is necessary to produce and protect corporate profits abroad and threats from abroad); ¶ < Cronyism and governmental corruption (it is very beneficial to have ex-corporate employees run the agencies or make the laws that are supposed to regulate or check corporations);¶ < Fraudulent elections (especially those where corporations run the machinery of elections and count the votes or where judges decide their outcomes); ¶ < Nationalism (disdain for other countries that might promote individual rights);¶ < Obsession with national security (anti-corporatists are a security risk to the corporate status quo); ¶ < Control of the media (propaganda works);¶ < Obsession with crime and punishment (anti-corporatists belong in jail); and ¶ < Disdain for intellectuals and the arts (these people see corporatism for what it is and are highly individualistic). ¶ All of these characteristics have a fairly obvious corporate component to them or produce a fairly obvious corporate benefit. Even Britt’s last two characteristics, the merger of state with the dominant religion and rampant suppression of divorce, abortion and homosexuality produce at least some indirect corporate benefit. ¶ In sum, it’s the corporate state, stupid. ¶ As I have pondered what could be done about America’s steady march toward the fascist state, I also have pondered what can be done internally to stop it. The Germans couldn’t seem to do it. The Italians couldn’t seem to do it. The only lesson from recent history where an indigenous people seemed to have uncoupled the merger of economic power with governmental power is the French Revolution. The soft underbelly of consolidated economic power is that the power resides in the hands of a few. Cut off the money supply of the few and the merger between economic power and government becomes unglued. The French systematically took out their aristocracy one by one. It was ugly; the French couldn’t seem to figure out when there had been enough bloodletting to solve the problem. ¶ The thought of an American twenty-first century French Revolution is ugly. But the thought of an American twenty-first century fascist state is far uglier. It would be a supreme irony that the state most responsible for stopping worldwide fascism would become fascist 60 years later. But far worse than this irony is the reality that an American fascist state with America’s power could make Nazi Germany look like a tiny blip on the radar screen of history. ¶ For some years now we have lived with the Faustian bargain of the corporation. Large corporations are necessary to achieve those governmental and social necessities that small enterprises are incapable of providing. The checks on corporate power have always been fragile. Left unchecked, the huge economic power of corporations corrupts absolutely. Most of the checks are badly eroded. Is there still time to get the checks back in balance? Or will we be left with two unthinkable options?

#### Battaile’s philosophy causes a rejection of democracy

Geroulanos, 2006

[OCTOBER 117, Summer 2006, pp. 3–24. © 2006 October Magazine, Ltd. and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The anthropology of exit: Bataille on Heidegger and Fascism] /Wyo-MB

Of interest in “Critique of Heidegger” is Bataille’s theologico-political analysis of modern democracy and his rejection of fascism as illusory and insufﬁcient.¶ In this regard, his 1930s work recalls other contemporaries not fully committed to a political cause, in that it is concerned less with a critique of democracy per se¶ than with the contestation of the primacy of secular/liberal/positivist motifs in¶ European Spirit. Such condemnations of existing democracies often mingled with¶ attacks on claims of nineteenth-century science or on the Enlightenment potential¶ for barbarism—in a sense they sought to save a spirit of autonomy by rejecting¶ democracy. In the context Bataille was among the ﬁrst to analyze fascism’s sacralization of politics, its inversion of the Augustinian idea of the City of Man, and its attack¶ on the claims of modern individualism.13 He identiﬁed fascism’s “overcoming” of¶ profane democratic reality with a political Unhappy Consciousness that replaces the¶ good God with the Chef-Dieu (“God-Leader”). The attention paid to themes like sovereignty and freedom in “Critique of Heidegger” further expresses Bataille’s hostility¶ toward democracy, the regime that he accuses of obliterating them in favor of a society composed of (and constructing) undifferentiated, unself-conscious subjects.

#### DEMOCRACY NECESSARY TO AVERT NUCLEAR WAR AND EXTINCTION

**CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT**, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s,” October 19**95**. Available from the World Wide Web at: <http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html>, accessed 2/20/04.

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

#### The aff cedes the political

Fortuna 10

(John J., University of California Santa Barbara, approved Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, “Ordinary Sacrifices: An Approach to Loss in Democratic Politics,” March, 2010, http://gradworks.umi.com/3398839.pdf//wyo-mm)

As to the question of whether Bataille’s theory of sacrifice works to help individuals better understand their status as citizens, and in doing so assist them in navigating the difficult spaces of loss that inevitably attends political citizenship— the result is a mixed one. As seen above, focusing only upon Bataille’s theory of sacrifice does not yield much in the way of explicit political recommendations. Additionally, unlike some of his predecessors (e.g. Durkheim), Bataille’s thoughts on sacrifice appear much more individualistic—by which I mean that the latter’s focus on sacrifice is much less imbued with the idea of sacrifice taking place within a communal context then is seen in the thought of the former. Because Durkheim’s analysis of sacrifice (both ritual and civic) occurs within a context that emphasizes group membership, it is more naturally fitted to address questions of political citizenship. Bataille’s theory of sacrifice, by not focusing on sacrifice as a collective activity, is less able to easily inform discussions of citizenship.

#### And – Anti-Politics dooms their project, threatens the planet, and cedes politics to the Right.

Boggs ’97 (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75